Community Property—Savings Bonds—Community Property—Supremacy Clause by Keefe, Richard E.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 38 
Number 2 Washington Case Law—1962 
7-1-1963 
Community Property—Savings Bonds—Community 
Property—Supremacy Clause 
Richard E. Keefe 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Family Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard E. Keefe, Washington Case Law, Community Property—Savings Bonds—Community 
Property—Supremacy Clause, 38 Wash. L. Rev. 255 (1963). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol38/iss2/2 
This Washington Case Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
16VASHINGTON CASE LAW
COMIUNITY PROPERTY
Savings Bonds-Community Property-Supremacy Clause.
Federal law is generally interstitial in its nature. It rarely occupies a
legal field completely, totally excluding al participation by the legal
systems of the states.... It builds upon legal relationships established
by the states, altering or supplanting them only so far as necessary for
the special purpose. Congress acts, in short, against the background
of the total corpus juris of the states in much the way that a state legis-
lature acts against the background of the common law, assumed to
govern unless changed by legislation.... Indeed, the strength of the
conception of the central government as one of delegated, limited
authority is most significantly manifested on this mundane plane of
working, legislative practice.'
Introduction. This note concerns the conflict between federal and
state law in a difficult though narrow area which is representative of
broader problems in contemporary federalism. Specifically, the subject
is the clash between the survivorship provisions of United States sav-
ings bonds2 and state community property laws, as evinced in two
recent cases, Free v. Bland' and Yiatchos v. Yiatchos.4 These cases
1 HART AND WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SysTEm 435
(1953).2 Section 757c(a) of Title 31 U.S.C. (1959) provides:
"The Secretary of the Treasury, with the approval of the President, is authorized
to issue from time to time ... United States savings bonds . . . , the proceeds of
which shall be available to meet any public expenditures authorized by law, and to
retire any outstanding obligations of the United States bearing interest or issued on
a discount basis. The various issues and series of the savings bonds ... shall be in
such forms, shall be offered in such amounts, subject to the limitation imposed by
section 757b of this title, and shall be issued in such manner and subject to such terms
and conditions consistent with subsections (b)-(d) of this section, and including any
restrictions on their transfer, as the Secretary of the Treasury may from time to
time prescribe." (The limitations and conditions mentioned are not relevant to the
present discussion.)
31 Code of Federal Regulations, Money and Finance, chapter 2 (1959) (hereinafter
cited as 31 CFR) provides in part:
"§ 315.5 General. United States Savings Bonds are issued only in registered form.
The form of registration used must express the actual ownership of and interest in the
bond and, except as otherwise specifically provided in Subpart E and § 315.48 of Sub-
part I of this part, will be considered as conclusive of such ownership and inter-
est .... (Again, the exceptions are not relevant in the present context.)
§ 315.7 Authorized Forms of Registration. Subject to any limitations or restrictions
contained in these regulations on the right of any person to be named as owner, co-
owner, or beneficiary, savings bonds may be registered in the following forms:(a) Natural persons ...
(1) Single onzer
(2) Coownership forn--two persons (only). In the alternative as coowners.
Example: 'John A. Jones or Mrs. Ella S. Jones.
(3) Beneficiary fornm--two persons (only). Examples: 'John A. Jones payable
on death to Mrs. Ella S. Jones! . . . 'Payable on death' may be abbreviated
to 'P.O.D.' . . . The first named person is . . . the owner and.., the
second... the beneficiary.
§ 315.15 Limitation on transfer or pledge. Savings bonds are not transferable and
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will be examined while seeking an answer to two questions: "How were
the cases actually decided?" and "How should they have been de-
cided?"'
Free v. Bland. John W. and Mary Ida Free were married and
resident in Texas, a community property state in which each spouse
has an undivided one-half interest in the community property. The
husband is manager.6 Free purchased a number of United States
savings bonds, using community funds, which were issued in co-owner
form to: "Mr. or Mrs. Free."' After Mrs. Free's death, a dispute
arose over the bonds between Free and James F. Bland, her son by
a previous marriage. Free claimed exclusive ownership due to the
are payable only to the owners named thereon, except as specifically provided in the
regulations in this part and then only in the manner and to the extent so provided ...
§ 315.20 General. (a) No judicial determination will be recognized which would
give effect to an attempted voluntary transfer inter vivos of a bond or would defeat or
otherwise impair the rights of survivorship conferred by these regulations upon a
surviving coowner or beneficiary, and all other provisions of this subpart are subject
to this restriction. Otherwise, a claim against an owner or coowner of a savings bond
and conflicting claims as to ownership of, or interest in, such bond as between co-
owners or between the registered owner and beneficiary will be recognized, when
established by valid judicial proceedings, upon presentation and surrender of the bond,
but only as specifically provided in this subpart.
§ 315.60 During the lives of both owners. . . . (a) Pa3nnent. The bond will be paid
to either upon his separate request, and upon payment to him the other will cease to
have any interest in the bond ...
§ 315.61 After the death of one or both coowners. If either coowner dies without
the bond having been presented and surrendered for payment or authorized reissue,
the survivor will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner. Thereafter, payment
or reissue will be made as though the bond were issued in the name of the survivor
alone ...
(The preceding two subsections of course refer to "co-owner" bonds, while the fol-
lowing ones deal with "P.O.D." bonds.)
§ 315.65 During the lifetime of the registered owner. A savings bond registered
in beneficiary form ...will be paid or reissued upon presentation and surrender (by
the registered owner alone) during the lifetime of the registered owner ...
§ 315.66 After the death of the registered owner. If the registered owner dies
without the bond having been presented and surrendered for payment or authorized
reissue and is survived by the beneficiary, upon proof of death of the owner the bene-
ficiary will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner, and payment or reissue will
be made as though the bond were registered in his name alone. . ....
3369 U.S. 663 (1962).
4 160 Wash. Dec. 180, 373 P.2d 125 (1962), cert. granted, 83 Sup. Ct. 721 (1963).
Certiorari was granted on Feb. 18, 1963, and the case (No. 659) was placed on the
summary calendar for argument during October Term, 1963.
5 A noted legal scholar, F. S. Cohen, has suggested these to be the "only...
significant questions in the field of law." And further: "Unless a legal 'problem' can
be subsumed under one of these forms, it is not a meaningful question and any answer
to it must be nonsense." F. S. Cohen, Tranucendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUar. L. REV. 809, 824 (1935). (Also found in COHEN & COHEN,
READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 573 (1951).)
6369 U.S. at 664. Generally, the incidents of the Texas system are not unlike
those in Washington, although it is probably true that the Washington husband has
a more restricted managing power. Compare the incidents discussed by the Court at
664 (especially notes 1 and 2) with Cross, The Community Property Law in Wash-
ington, 15 LA. L. REV. 640, 642 (1955).
7 See 31 CFR § 315.7(a) (2), note 2 supra.
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Treasury regulations which provided that when either co-owner dies,
"the survivor will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner." s
However, Bland demanded either half the bonds, or reimbursement
to the extent of his mother's community interest in the bonds (i.e., half
their value) on the ground that by Texas law the bonds were com-
munity property, and thus subject to Mrs. Free's testamentary dis-
position of her half interest.
The crux of the matter was whether the federal regulations created
a distinct type of federal ownership or merely provided a convenient
method of payment for the Government. In essence, the opposing
arguments were: For Free---The federal regulations create a unique
federal ownership, whose incidents are inconsistent with those of com-
munity property."0 (By purchasing the bonds the basic character of
ownership is changed, such that the bonds and the funds they represent
are no longer community in character.) Therefore, any inconsistent
state law must fall under the Supremacy Clause.' For Bland 2 -the
federal regulations do not confer substantive ownership rights, but are
merely for the convenience' 8 of the Government, which is disinterested
in who ultimately gets the proceeds.' (This will be termed the "con-
venience theory.") Hence, there is no change in the character of
ownership, the bonds remain community property and are subject to
state testamentary laws.
Free brought suit to settle this controversy, Bland counterclaiming.
A Texas court awarded the bonds to Free on his motion for summary
judgment, but granted Bland reimbursement of his interest under the
will. Free appealed to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, relying on
8 31 CFR § 315.61, note 2 supra.
9 Brief for Petitioner, pp. 8-10. See also, Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae, p. 12.
10If they do create such an ownership, the inconsistency is self-evident. For ex-
ample, either co-owner has full power to unilaterally cash the bonds (See 31 CFR §
315.60, note 2 supra), while neither has any testamentary power over them (see 31
CFR §§ 315.20, 315.61, note 2 supra). Also, the mutually exclusive nature of the
types of ownership is analagous to that of joint tenancy (which the bond ownership
closely resembles) and community property. See Griffith, Comnmunity Property in
Joint Tenancy Form, 14 STAN. L. REV. 87 (1962) ; and Griffith, Joint Tenancy and
Community Property, 37 WAsH. L. Rsv. 30 (1962).
"'U.S. CoxsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
12 Brief for Respondent, pp. 4-5.
13 E.g., to insulate the Government from numerous transfers of the bonds, by per-
mitting its obligation to be fulfilled through payment to the registered owner or bene-
ficiary-and to save it from involvement in such disputes as Free.
14 Another variation on this is that even if the regulations do create ownership
rights, they only provide that the surviving co-owner "will be recognized as sole
owner," not that "he will be owner" of the bonds and or proceeds. Thus it would be
proper to award Free title to the bonds, while simultaneously negating this by award-
ing Bland reimbursement. See 31 CRF § 315.61, note 2 supra.
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an earlier Texas case, Ricks v. Smith,5 which had rejected the "con-
venience theory" and given full effect to the federal ownership rights.
That court affirmed the award of the bonds to Free, but denied Bland
any reimbursement, so holding on the authority of Ricks."
While Bland's writ of error was pending in the Texas Supreme Court,
that court decided Hilley v. Hilley,"7 which expressly overruled Ricks.
Albeit specifically concerning corporate stock purchased with com-
munity funds and issued to husband and wife as joint tenants with the
right of survivorship, Hilley made the sweeping pronouncement that
married couples in Texas could not agree to any survivorship provision
re community property, without "partitioning" it pursuant to certain
statutory formalities.'
The court then spoke to the savings bond question:
[W]e are convinced that the Ricks decision cannot be reconciled
with the provisions of our Constitution and statutes .... It is clear
that the Federal regulations do not override our local laws in matters
of purely private ownership where the interests of the United States
are not involved. Bank of America Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Parnell,
353 U.S. 29 .... 19
In short, Texas accepted the "convenience theory,"2 rejecting the
supremacy of the federal regulations.
In Free, the highest Texas court then reversed per curiam the Court
of Civil Appeals on the authority of Hilley, and reinstated the judg-
ment of the trial court.21
Free sought and obtained review in the United States Supreme Court.
15 159 Tex. 280, 318 S.W.2d 439 (1958). Ricks arose from a dispute over a will.
One Dooley and his wife owned certain United States savings bonds, purchased with
community property, as co-owners. The wife being mentally ill, Dooley willed all his
property to the Rickses (with directions that they use it to care for his wife till her
death). Dooley passed away, followed shortly by his wife. The Rickses and the wife's
heirs both claimed the bonds. The Texas court held for the heirs on the basis that
the bonds created substantive survivorship rights which must prevail over the incon-
sistent state law, thereby rejecting the "convenience theory." The court stated: "There
is no sanctity of the community property law above that of other types of law. To
give supremacy to Federal regulations no more affects community property law than
laws of descent and distribution." 159 Tex. 280, 318 S.W.2d 439, 440 (1958).
16 Free v. Bland, 337 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. Civ. App. 1960).
1-, 161 Tex. 569, 342 S.W.2d 565 (1961).
18 See, VeRNoN's TEX. Civ. STAT. ANN., art. 881a-23 (vol. 2 1953) and art. 4624a
(vol. 13 1960).
19 342 S.W.2d at 570. See the discussion of Parnell, infra at 270.
20 Prior to Free, the Supreme Court of the United States had not considered this
question. The decisions of the state and lower federal courts were in disarray, but a
clear majority had rejected the "convenience theory." See, Annot., 37 A.L.R.2d 1512
(1954). One of the two cases cited by the Texas court to support the convenience
approach was In re Allen's Estate, 54 Wn.2d 616, 343 P.2d 867 (1959), discussed
infra at 263.
21 Bland v. Free, 344 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. 1961).
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Addressing himself to the above-quoted language in Hilley, Mr. Chief
Justice Warren wrote:
The Supreme Court of Texas' interpretation of the Supremacy
Clause is not in accord with controlling doctrine. The relative import-
ance to the State of its own law is not material when there is a conflict
with a valid federal law, for the Framers of our Constitution provided
that the federal law must prevail. Article VI, clause 2. This principle
was made clear by Chief Justice Marshall when he stated... that any
state law, however clearly within a state's acknowledge power, which
interferes with or is contrary to federal law, must yield. Gibbons v.
Ogden .... Thus our inquiry is directed toward whether there is a
valid federal law, and if so, whether there is a conflict with state law.22
He then found that the regulations providing for bonds with survivor-
ship constituted a valid exercise of federal power, holding that the
survivor "will be recognized as the sole and absolute owner,"2 " and
"no judicial determination will be recognized which would defeat or
impair the rights of survivorship conferred by these regulations"
on a co-owner or beneficiary. Noting that the Treasury had consistently
rejected the "convenience theory,125 the opinion read:
The respondent, however, contends that the purpose of the regula-
tion is simply to provide a convenient method of payment. 9 (9: See,
e.g., Decker v. Fowler, 199 Wash. 549.... In this case the Govern-
ment participated as anicus curiae in support of an application for
rehearing, urging that the court had erroneously construed the regula-
tions.) This argument depends primarily on the distinction between
stating that the surviving co-owner will "be recognized as" the sole
owner and stating the surviving co-owner will "be" the sole owner.
This distinction is insubstantial. The clear purpose of the regulations
is to confer the right of survivorship on the surviving co-owner. Thus,
the survivorship provision is a federal law which must prevail if it
conflicts with state law. . . . (Emphasis added. Other footnofes
omitted.) 26
Three things are implicit in this passage: a) The federal regulations
set up a federal ownership, whose incidents are inconsistent with those
of community property; b) the change in the basic character of owner-
22 Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962).
23 He reasoned from the borrowing power in the Constitution (art. I, § 8, cl. 2)
through the statute (31 U.S.C. § 757c, set out in note 2 supra) to the quoted pro-
visions of 31 CFR § 315.61, set out in note 2 supra.2431 CFR § 315.20, set out in note 2 supra.
25 The Treasury had maintained this position in various pamphlets, letters and
statements dating back to at least 1935. These are set out in Brief of the United States
as Amicus Curiae, pp. 29-61, Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).26369 U.S. at 668. -
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ship occurs when the bonds are purchased, not at some later time, e.g.,
death of the purchaser; 7 and c) these federal rights must prevail over
any conflicting state law, community property or other. Of course,
the crux of the matter is the interpretation of the federal regulations.
This clearly required that the Court answer a policy question-what
construction should be placed on the regulations-which it was not
bound to answer either way." Once this decision was made, it was
purely mechanical to apply the Supremacy Clause, and declare that
"the State has interfered directly with a legitimate exercise of the
power of the Federal Government to borrow money.112 9  The Chief
Justice articulated the reasons for this choice:
The success of the management of the national debt depends to a
significant measure upon the success of the sales of the savings bonds.
The Treasury is authorized to make the bonds attractive to savers and
investors. One of the inducements selected by the Treasury is the
survivorship provision, a convenient method of avoiding complicated
probate proceedings. 30
Since over 40 billion dollars in savings bonds are outstanding, there
is a substantial federal interest in the attractiveness and stability of
the bonds. No doubt this would have been severely impaired by a
welter of conflicting state rules had the "convenience theory" been
accepted.81 Thus, the wisdom of the Court's choice would seem sound.
But, as strong as the policy considerations are, they nonetheless are
not all-pervading, as we find from the opinion:
Our holding is supported by Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 ....
There the Congress made clear its intent to allow a serviceman to
select the beneficiary of his own government life insurance policy re-
gardless of state law, even when it was likely that the husband intended
to deprive his wife of a right to share in his life insurance proceeds, a
27 Clearly if a co-owner did not acquire a federal property right immediately upon
purchase of the bond, he could not unilaterally surrender the bond and receive pay-
ment of the present value. See, 31 CFR § 315.60, set out in note 2 supra.
28 See Cohen, supra note 5, at 839-42 (also found in COHEN & COHEN, op. cit. supra
note 5, at 433-35).
29 369 U.S. at 669.
30 Ibid.
31 See, Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, pp. 6-7, where it is also suggested
that to overturn the long-standing administrative interpretation would induce many
small investors to redeem their bonds early, thereby upsetting the management of the
national debt, in addition to deterring future investment. The "attractiveness" argu-
ment seems to be premised on the desire of the small investor both to avoid compli-
cated probate proceedings, and to set up joint ownership or survivorship without the
requisite formalities of some state laws (such as the procedures required by the Texas
statutes cited note 18 supra).
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right guaranteed by state law. [32] But the regulations governing sav-
ings bonds do not go that far. While affording purchasers of bonds the
opportunity to choose a survivorship provision which must be recog-
nized by the states, the regulations neither insulate the purchasers from
all claims regarding ownership nor immunize the bonds from execution
in satisfaction of a judgment. The Solicitor General, appearing as
amicus curiae, acknowledges that there is an exception implicit in the
savings bond regulations, including the survivorship provision, so that
federal bonds will not be a "sanctuary for a wrongdoer's gains." With
this, we agree. The regulations are not intended to be a shield for
fraud and relief would be available in a case where the circumstances
manifest fraud or a breach of trust tantamount thereto on the part of a
husband while acting in his capacity as manager of the general com-
munity property. However, the doctrine of fraud applicable under
federal law' 4 (14: "See, e.g., Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392,
66 S.Ct. 582, 90 L.Ed. 743; Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318
U.S. 363, 63 S.Ct. 573, 87 L.ED. 838.") in such a case must be de-
termined on another day, for this issue is not presently here. (Em-
phasis added. Other footnotes omitted.) 33
Since Free came up on cross motions for summary judgment, the
Court, on May 21, 1962, reversed and remanded in order that the
fraud question might be clarified, precipitating a rather curious opinion
from the Washington court five weeks later,3 4 due in part at least to
the seemingly innocuous "footnote 14."
Yiatchos v. Yiatchos. Angel and Pearle Yiatchos were married and
residents of Washington. Angel died in 1958, Pearle qualifying as
executrix of her husband's estate." Angel had purchased United
States savings bonds to the sum of $15,075, registered in his name
and payable on death to his brother Gust Yiatchos3 0 The bonds had
been purchased with community funds and apparently were in the
32Even though Wissner may be explained not only by the clear congressional man-
date, but also by the fact that the "insurance" was subsidized by the government to
the point that it was more a gratuity than a true underwriting of risk, the case has
evoked a number of less than complimentary Notes and Comments, the general
criticism being that it was an unnecessary interference with state-created and pro-
tected rights: see, e.g., Comment, 47 CALin L. Rrv. 374 (1959); Note, 26 WAsH. L.
REy. 61 (1951).
33369 U.S. at 670.34Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 160 Wash. Dec. 180, 373 P2d 125 (1962), cert. granted
83 Sup. Ct. 721 (1963). The decision by the Washington court was on June 28, 1962,
while certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States was granted on Feb. 18,
1963.
3 The facts are taken from the "record" below (as found in the "Statement of
Facts" on appeal), as they were stipulated before trial and referred to but briefly on
appeal. Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, Douglas County Case No. 2922 (hereinafter cited as
"Record").30I.e., the bonds were in P.O.D. form with Gust as beneficiary. See 31 CFR §
315.7(a) (3), set out in note 2 supra.
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possession of Angel at his death. However, Angel had made his last
will on October 7, 1954, wherein he bequeathed all bonds that he
might own at death to Gust, four sisters and a nephew, share and
share alike. These savings bonds were, in fact, the only ones which
he possessed at death. Pearle refused to deliver them to Gust, where-
upon the latter brought suit." The facts were stipulated before trial.
The court made, inter alia, these conclusions of law: The bonds were
the community property of Angel and Pearle at the time of his death;
"the community cannot be deprived of community funds by the pur-
chase of government bonds;" all the bonds should be inventoried in
Angel's estate, one-half (or their proceeds) going to Pearle, with the
remainder to be distributed according to Angel's will. 8 The judge
imposed a trust upon the bonds, and directed Gust to endorse them
that they might be sold and parcelled out. 9
To place the trial judge's decision on March 17, 1961, in proper
perspective, it should be remembered that Free had not yet been
decided and that two Washington cases4" arguably "controlled" Yiat-
chos. One of these, Decker v. Fowler,4  was the first Washington case
involving United States savings bonds. There the beneficiary designa-
tion on P.O.D. bonds was denied effect, on the theory that absent a
valid delivery of the bonds, the designation was an abortive gift. The
court in Decker (which did not involve community property) stated
that the Treasury regulations were merely "for the convenience of the
Federal government" and further that "it was no concern of the
Federal government to whom the money might belong after it was
paid."42 Thus, Washington adopted the "convenience theory." Other
courts refused to follow this approach.43 Indeed, the reasoning was im-
mediately assailed and shown to be fallacious, for the reason that the
bond, being a contract between the purchaser and the Government,
37 Gust's rights under the federal regulations are found in 31 CFR § 315.66, set
out in note 2 supra.
38 Record, p. 7. Pursuant to the community property law, one-half of the community
property goes to the surviving spouse, while the other half is subject to the testa-
mentary disposition of the decedent. See RCW 11.04.050.
39 Record, p. 14.
40 I re Allen's Estate, 54 Wn.2d 616, 343 P.2d 867 (1959) ; Decker v. Fowler, 199
Wash. 549, 92 P.2d 254 (1939).
41 Note 40 supra.
42 199 Wash. at 552, 92 P.2d at 256.
43 E.g., Lee v. Anderson, 70 Ariz. 208, 218 P.2d 732 (1950); Conrad v. Conrad,
66 Cal. App. 2d 280, 152 P.2d 221 (1944) ; Franklin Washington Trust Co. v. Beltram,
133 N.J. Eq. 11, 29 A.2d 854 (1943); Ervin v. Conn, 225 N.C. 267, 34 S.E.2d 402
(1945). Contra., Slater v. Culpepper, 222 La. 962, 64 So. 2d 234 (1953). A clear
majority of courts have rejected the Decker approach. See generally, Annots., 37
A.L.R.2d 1216 (1954), 168 A.L.R. 245 (1947).
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did not give rise to considerations of "gift" and to talk of delivery
makes no sense at all.-" The Washington legislature, apparently toW
"overrule" Decker, passed Chapter 13 of the Laws of 1943," 5 which
purports to make the surviving co-owner or P.O.D. beneficiary the
sole and absolute owner of the bonds.
The second bond case,4" In re.Allen's Estate,7 came up in 1959 and
is remarkably similar to Free on its facts. In Allen, the husband pur-
chased P.O.D. bonds with community funds. These were registered
in his name with the wife as beneficiary. After her death, the husband
claimed the bonds as his separate property, while her son by a former
marriage asserted them to be community in character and therefore
a part of her estate." The federal regulations provided that the hus-
band was the owner of the bonds," while the Washington statute"
44 See the Note by Professor Shattuck, 14 WAsH. L. REv. 312 (1939), where the
gift rationale is thoroughly demolished; also Note, 27 MINN. L. REv. 401 (1943).
45Now codified as RCW 11.04.230 and 11.04.240. RCW 11.04.230: "If either co-
owner of United States savings bonds registered in two names as co-owners (in the
alternative) dies without having presented and surrendered the bond for payment to
a federal reserve bank or the treasury department, the surviving co-owner will be
the sole and absolute owner of the bond."
RCW 11.04.240: "If the registered owner of United States savings bonds registered
in the name of one person payable on death to another dies without having presented
and surrendered the bond for payment or authorized reissue to a federal reserve bank
or the treasury department, and is survived by the beneficiary, the beneficiary will be
the sole and absolute owner of the bond."
46 There have been at least two other Washington cases dealing with United States
savings bonds: Makinen v. George, 19 Wn.2d 340, 142 P.2d 910 (1943) and Togliatti
v. Robertson, 29 Wn.2d 844, 190 P.2d 575 (1948). However, neither of these
add anything to the present discussion. In Makinen, a daughter had sold certain of
her real property and purchased United States savings bonds in the P.O.D. form with
the proceeds. The bonds were registered in her mother's name, with the daughter as
beneficiary. Upon the mother's death, the question arose whether the bonds were part
of her estate or the absolute property of the daughter. The trial court had held for
the estate on the authority of Decker. While recognizing that Decker seemingly con-
trolled, the Washington court distinguished it on the basis that the bonds there were
bought with the decedent's own funds. Nonetheless, Decker was adhered to in denying
effect to the federal regulations. But, since the mother's estate was insolvent (and
unable to cover funeral expenses), the court protected the daughter by awarding her
the bonds on a resulting trust theory. Thus, the "convenience theory" basis of Decker
was not disturbed. Indeed, the circuitous resulting trust route was necessitated by
Decker, while the federal regulations straightforwardly designated the daughter as
owner. Togliatti also involved savings bonds, but the state law was assunned to govern(under the "convenience theory") if the bonds had been purchased with community
funds. The real argument was whether property acquired after an interlocutory
divorce decree is separate or community. Holding it to be separate, the co-owner's
survivorship rights under the federal regulations were enforced.
47 54 Wn.2d 616, 343 P2d 867 (1959).
48 The only apparent difference between Free and Allen being that co-owner bonds
were at issue in the former and P.O.D. ones in the latter. While a co-owner does have
greater rights prior to the other owner's death than does a P.O.D. beneficiary prior to
the sole owner's death, the policy reasons for holding the bonds to create substantive
federal ownership rights are equally applicable to either type. Thus Free and Allen
seem indistinguishable.
49 See 31 CFR § 315.65, set out in note 2 supra.50 RCW 11.04.240, note 45 supra.
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was silent, not covering the situation when the beneficiary pre-deceases
the owner. The court concluded the bonds were still community
property, reaching the result by this route: The federal regulations
are solely for the convenience of the government, citing Decker; under
the Washington bond statutes this is an omitted problem; therefore,
the state community property law controls, such that the property
having been community in character, it retains this status absent
proof by the husband of a change (the bonds themselves apparently
are of no weight in showing such a change).
Against this background, Yiatchos was argued on the theory that the
bonds constituted a contract with the United States, and that the
Washington statute5 authorized the survivorship rights as a "will-
substitute."" However, the trial judge held that the statute, while it
might have changed Decker, did not cover bonds purchased with
community funds (on its face, the statute has no such exception), and
that Allen controlled." Decker and Allen may have "bound" the
judge to the "convenience theory" regarding interpretation of the Fed-
eral regulations. But, Allen was not a binding interpretation of the
statute since that case was clearly omitted thereunder. 4 Indeed, the
real question in Yiatchos was how should the statute be construed."
The appeal to the Washington Supreme Court was heard on March
5, 1962" (before the decision in Free). Though a few cases from
other jurisdictions construing the federal regulations as creating owner-
ship rights were discussed, the nub of appellant's argument was the
"will-substitute" concept." In a brief opinion by the late Judge Foster,
51 Ibid.
52 The essence of the "will-substitute" concept is that there is no change in the
character of ownership when funds are invested in United States savings bonds, but
that the terms of the contract will be given effect at the death of the purchaser, unless
prohibited by a rule of state law. The argument then runs that the statutes override
the earlier community property law, such that the federal regulations will be effec-
tuated. Thus, this concept is a middleground between the approach taken by the
Washington court and that adopted by the Supreme Court in Free. The "will-substi-
tute" idea is advanced by the author of a Note on the Allen case, found in 35 WASH.
L. REV. 280 (1960). However, it is clearly contrary to Free, which posits an im-
mediate change in the character of ownership.
5' Record, pp. 9-11.
54Ibid. At 11, one finds this somewhat perplexing language: "It appears to this
Court that neither the United States Congress nor the Washington State Legislature
has any right to change the property system in the State of Washington by acts pro-
viding for the issuance of United States Savings Bonds."
55 See note 28 supra.
5G Bar Docket, Washington Supreme Court (Jan. Sess. 1962) at 17.
5TBrief for Appellant, pp. 6-11. Again, this argument depended on RCW 11.04.230
and 11.04.240 having altered the earlier statute (RCW 11.04.050-see also, note 38
supra). The possible validity of the "will-substitute" as a matter of case law was
not mentioned. This would require an argument by analogy that the approach almost
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the Washington court rejected this approach, affirming the decision
below." The seemingly applicable Washington statutes 9 were sum-
marily disposed of on the authority of Allen, the court stating that
they "do not confer upon one spouse the power to convert community
property into separate property. (And quoting Allen) . . . If this
were not so, a designing spouse could at once transform community
property into separate property by the purchase of United States
bonds.810 There was in fact no proof in either Allen or Yiatckos that
a spouse was "designing." Rather in both cases there was a complete
lack of proof as to the circumstances surrounding the bond purchases.
However, these cases indicate that, absent a showing by the husband
of an agreement to change the character of ownership (or at least
knowledge and subsequent acquiescence by the wife), the purchase
of bonds in his own name (with either his wife or a third party as
P.O.D. beneficiary) will be presumed "fraudulent." Judge Foster
continued:
The husband's purchase with community funds of bonds payable to
him alone or, after his death, payable to his brother was in fraud of the
rights of the respondent wife.... This was an unilateral attempt to
convert community property into separate property, and void -ab
initio....
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Free v.
Bland... does not conflict.61
accepted in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Brock, 41 Wn.2d 369, 249 P2d 393 (1952), which-
affirmed the trial court in a four-to-four decision on the basis of Occidental Life Ins.
Co. v. Powers, 192 Wash. 475, 74 P.2d 27 (1937), should be applied to bonds. That
would be to enforce the bonds to the point where they conflict with the wife's rights
under community property law, such that Pearle would get her half interest, but the
regulations would be enforced to the remainder which would go to Gust.
'is Yiatchos v. Yiatchos 160 Wash. Dec. 180, 373 P.2d 125 (1962), cert. granted, 83
Sup. Ct 721 (1963).
59 The reluctance with which common-law, case-oriented judges receive legislation
which operates "in derogation of the common law" would seem one of the unfortunate
weak points in our law today. See, Horack, The Common Law of Legislation, 23 IowA
L. REV. 41 (1937) (reproduced in COHEN & COHEN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 491).
Such is not uncommon in this state, as may be seen from the various attempts to pro-
vide for survival of causes of action (see Note, 36 WASH. L. REv. 331 (1961)), and
the frustrated efforts of the Legislature to abolish sovereign immunity (see, e.g.,
Foster, J. dissenting in Macy v. Town of Chelan, 59 Wn.2d 610, 615, 369 P.2d 508,
511 (1962) ; and Comment, 36 WASH. L. Rv. 312 (1961).) Of course in the instant
situation the dismissal of the statutes is even stranger since community property itself
is a creature of the Legislature. Ironically, the Legislature upon enacting this system
thought it necessary to include this admonition: "The rule of the common law that
statutes in derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has no application to this
chapter." (Code of 1881, § 2417; now found under RCW 26.16.010, Construction.)60 373 P.2d at 126. Judge Foster also wrote Allen. Conspicuous by its absence is
reference to Decker, relied on by the trial court and in Allen as the basis of the
"convenience theory." No doubt this is due to footnote 9 of Free, which made it clear
that Deckcr was out of step with the prevailing law of the land.
61373 P2d at 127.
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In the next paragraph an attempt was made to distinguish Free on
its facts, but this was abandoned. The remainder of the opinion
sought to "fit" Yiatcos within the "fraud exception" to Free.6 " This
approach is somewhat unusual in two respects. First, as already noted,
the time sequence was: March 5, 1962-oral arguments in Yiatchos;
May 21, 1962-Free decided; June 28, 1962-Yiatchos decided. The
court thus considered and dismissed Free on its own initiative, without
the opportunity to receive arguments of counsel addressed to that
case. Secondly, the Washington court overlooked the change in the
basic character of ownership implicit in Free. In other words, the
court adhered to the "convenience theory" and denied the supremacy
of the federal regulations, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's con-
trary pronouncement. But, if this was unusual, the rest of the opinion
would seem extraordinary. It reads:
Chief Justice Warren expressly recognized the exception presented
by this record. The opinion [in Free] ... states:
"*** While affording purchasers of bonds the opportunity to choose
a survivorship provision which must be recognized by the states, the
regulations neither insulate the purchasers from all claims regarding
ownership nor immunize the bonds from execution in satisfaction of a
judgment. The Solicitor General, appearing as amicus curiae, acknow-
ledges that there is an exception implicit in the savings bond regula-
tions, including the survivorship provision, so that federal bonds will
not be a 'sanctuary for wrongdoer's gains.' With this, we agree. The
regulations are not intended to be a shield for fraud and relief would be
available in a case where the circumstances manifest fraud or a breach
of trust tantamount thereto on the part of a husband while acting in his
capacity as manager of the general community property.***"
This case falls within that exception. The purchase by the husband
of United States Government Bonds with community funds is a void
endeavor to divest the wife of any interest in her own property. While
the husband is the manager of the community personal property, he is
under a fiduciary duty to act for the benefit of the community. Gannon
v. Robinson [59 Wn.2d 906] .... 371 P.2d 274 (1962).(13) A breach
of this duty is a constructive fraud.64
62 See the Supreme Court's language, and especially footnote 14-quoted in text
accompanying note 33 supra.
63 Interestingly enough, Ganno, was also decided after oral argument in Yiatchos-
on May 10, 1962. The description of the husband's duties as "fiduciary" must be a
colloquial rather than literal one, as, e.g., the husband is under no affirmative duty to
act in order to enhance the value of the community property, nor must he keep his
separate assets segregated from those of the community. For a discussion of the
difficulties involved in transplanting the "fiduciary" concept into the community prop-
erty area, see Comment, 14 STAN. L. REv. 587 (1962).
64 373 P.2d at 127.
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The court then agreed with the trial court that Pearle was to get one-
half of the bonds, while the rest was to be distributed according to
Angel's will.
Comparing the part of Free quoted by the Washington court, with
that set out above in the discussion of Free, one notes that the court
omitted: "However, the doctrine of fraud applicable under federal
law" .. . must be determined on another day. .. " (This will be
hereinafter referred to as "federal fraud.") Instead of using federal
fraud, the Washington court defined the fraud exception to Free with
purely state law. It will be necessary to clarify the federal fraud con-
cept, but suffice it to say .at this time that the directive of the Supreme
Court is not satisfied by the application of purely Washington law.
Thus, this seems a strange way to "fit" Yiatchos within the exception
to Free."5
Federal Fraud. On its face the opinion in Free v. Bland does not
attempt to define the fraud doctrine6 the Court deems applicable.
But the Court cites relevant cases in footnote 14: Holmberg v. Arm-
brecht67 and Clearfield Trust. Co. v United States.", They leave little
room for argument. In both cases the court created, and applied a
uniquely federal rule." This prescription raises three questions: 1)
65 Exactly how the Washington. court reached the conclusion that the designation
of Gust as beneficiary was totally ineffective is not clear. On one hand, the court-may
have accepted the "change in character of ownership" rationale of Free, but reasoned
further that the "fraud" (by state law) vitiated the entire transaction such that there
was no effective change in ownership. If this is true, the -court merely erred in
applying state rather than federal law.
However, it is doubtful this was -the path. followed- Rather, it is the. writer's
opinion that the court uncritically relied on. Allen (and the "convenience theory") to
decide the case-and then, rather as an afterthought, stated that Free did "not con-
flict," purporting to "fit" Yiatchos within the fraud exception to Free. This conclusion
follows from the refusal by the Washington -court in Allen (and Yiatchos) to give
any prima facie effect to the bonds (i.e., to recognize that the bonds of themselves
show that a "change in the character of ownership" has occurred). Denying this
change and adhering to Allen--the "convenience theory"--flies in the face of Free.
Had the Washington court actually wished to "fit!' Yiatchoas within Free, it would
first have had to repudiate Allen (or at least omit reference to it, as it is inconsistent
with Free), recognize the initial change in ownership, and then apply the fraud ex-
ception. Indeed, without recognizing this ownership change,, there -is no occasion to
ever apply federal law. In short, by this approach the Washington court never reached
the fraud exception, since it denied Free's basic premise and adhered to Allem This;
the funds retained their community character, one half being Pearle's while the other
half was controlled by Angel's will.
"" Albeit the court said that the doctrine of fraud "must be determined-on another
day," it should become clear from the remainder of this paper that the court meant
to prescribe the "type' of law applicable, leaving only the details to be worked out
"on another day."
37 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
08 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
61 Also it is clear from their facts that the cases were not cited to block out, as it
were, the substance of the "principles or rules" to be applied to a case such as Free.
See the discussion of Clearfield, infra at 268; and of Holmberg, infra at 271.
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What alternatives, if any, did the Court have; 2) if there was a choice,
why this one; and 3) in any event, what is federal fraud?
The Clearfield Doctrine. On April 28, 1936, a pay check was
drawn on the Treasurer of the United States and mailed to a WPA
employee.7" It was intercepted by a person unknown, who forged the
payee's signature, and cashed it. The check was endorsed for collection
to the Clearfield Trust Co., which endorsed over to the Federal Re-
serve Bank of Philadelphia, guaranteeing prior endorsements. In
May, the employee notified his superior that the check had not been
received, but the Trust Co. was not notified of the forgery by the
Government until January 12, 1937, and of its demand for reimburse-
ment until August 31, 1937. Clearfield refused. Suit was brought in
a federal district court on the guarantee of prior endorsements, the
Trust Co. prevailing due to the application of Pennsylvania law, by
which the unreasonably long delay in notification and demand was
fatal to the Government's action. The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed.7 The Supreme Court affirmed:
[T] he rule of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins... does not apply to this
action. The rights and duties of the United States on commercial
paper which it issues are governed by federal rather than local law....
In the absence of an applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal
courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to their own
standards....
In our choice of the applicable federal rule we have occasionally
selected state law.... But reasons which may make state law at times
the appropriate federal rule are singularly inappropriate here. The
issuance of commercial paper by the United States is on a vast scale
and transactions in that paper from issuance to payment will commonly
occur in several states. The application of state law... would subject
the rights and duties of the United States to exceptional uncertainty.
. .. The desirability of a uniform rule is plain. .. 72
Thus the Court created the applicable law-a policy decision-in
order to further the interests of the federal government and nation
as it saw them. To do this, the Court first73 hurdled Erie R. Co. v.
70 The check was for $28.40. Ironically, from such an origin a formidable doctrine
of "federal common law" emerged.
71 United States v. Clearfield Trust Co., 130 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1942).
72 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943). The Court
went on to state that lack of prompt notice might be a defense, but only if shown
that actual harm resulted thereby.
73 Actually, there was another reason why state law, as such, could have been
applied in Clearfield (and Free as to the "fraud exception"). The Rules of Decision
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1959), provides: "The laws of the several states, except
where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise
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Tompkins,"' with its broad pronouncement that there is no "federal
general common law.""5 Erie was read as merely requiring an appli-
cation of state decisional (in addition to statutory) "law" in diversity
actions, but not to cover situations where a substantial federal interest
was present."' Finding such an interest in Clearfield, a "federal com-
mon law" was created to define the rights and duties arising from
government paper. But as the quotation opening this note emphasizes,7
federal law operates interstitially on the foundation of state-created
rights and duties. Thus, stating that federal law governs merely
means that Erie (and thus the law of a particular state) does not con-
trol. The crucial question then becomes: To what extent will state
law be incorporated into federal law in order to define the federal
rights? While Clearfield builds on state law, e.g., to provide a cause
of action on the guarantee of prior endorsements, it rejects the deter-
minative local law regarding time for notice in favor of a uniform rule.
require or provide, shall be regarded as the rules of decision in civil actions in the
courts of the United States, it cases where they apply!' (Emphasis added.) While
this Act arguably applies only to diversity actions (see, Reifenberg, Federal Common
Law, 30 ORE. L. REv. 164 (1951)), it has been applied in non-diversity cases. -E.g.,
Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 306 U.S. 103 (1939) ; Campbell Soup Co. v.
Armour & Co., 175 F.2d 795 (3d Cir. 1949). The better interpretation is that it
should not be limited to diversity jurisdiction. See Comment, Clearfield, Clouded Field
of Federal Coinmon Law, 53 CoLuM. L. Ray. 991, 993-97 (1953). Neither Clearfield
nor Free came within the specific exception to the Act, for the reason that there was
no Act of Congress requiring the application of federal law (indeed in Free, the "fraud
exception" is clearly a problem omitted by both Congress and the Treasury Regula-
tions). Thus, the Rules of Decision Act is inapplicable for the reason that Clearfikld
and Free are not "cases where they ... (state laws) apply." This determination
was another unarticulated policy decision in which the Court decided that state law
should not apply.
74 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
7 Id. at 78.
76 Of course, the main impact of Erie was to abrogate the fallacious jurisprudential
notions of Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (1842), which had termed state court decisions
merely "evidence" of the law, and which were posited on the idea of a transcendental
body of rules existing in the abstract which the Court could "find" were it sufficiently
diligent. That Mr. Justice Brandeis did not mean Erie to be of such a broad scope
as a literal reading might suggest, may be seen from this passage in Hinderlider v.
LaPlata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938), which was also-
written by him, on the same day (April 25, 1938) as Erie: "For whether the water
of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the two States is a question of
federal common law.. . " Thus while "federal general common law" might be dead,
a "federal common law" was created in its stead. This exception to Erie was first
widened to include cases dealing with a substantial federal interest (vis-a-vis contro-
versies between states) in Board of County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343(1939). There, the United States was asserting the rights of a treaty Indian, in an
action to recover taxes illegally assessed by the Kansas county. The liability for
interest was held to be a question of federal law, due to the treaty. Even though a
question of federal law, the Court adopted the local law (barring recovery of interest
by a taxpayer) as the federal law. While D'Oench, Duhme & Co. Inc. v. FDIC, 315
U.S. 447 (1942), also concerned the creation of an unique federal rule (vice adoption),
Clearfield was the first clear exposition of the concept with its rationale of uni-
formity-hence the term, the Clearfield Doctrine.
7 HART AND WE CHSLER, op. cit. sitpra note 1.
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Incorporation. While some cases have found determinative the
need for uniformity," others have deemed the policy of minimum
interference with state-created rights and duties to be more conso-
nant with our federal system and one which is best served by adopting
(i.e., incorporating) the law of the particular state as the federal law.79
Perhaps the most apposite example of the latter approach is Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Parnell." The Bank of
America held certain bearer bonds (payment guaranteed by the
United States) of the Federal Home Owner's Loan Corporation, which
were called some eight years prior to maturity. The bonds disappeared
the following day. Later, the thief used defendants Parnell and First
'Nat'l Bank to cash the bonds for him. Bank of America sued for
conversion in a federal district court, alleging jurisdiction on diversity
of citizenship. The principal issues were whether the bonds were
"overdue" when defendants received them, and their good faith in
handling them. The trial judge charged the defendants with the bur-
den of showing good faith as a matter of state law, which he con-
sidered governing due to diversity. The Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed,8 holding that Clearfield controlled so that federal law
placed the burden of proof on Bank of America. The Supreme Court
then reversed,82 holding that albeit distinctly federal law governed
the overdueness question, state law controlled the burden of proof
on good faith. Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote for the Court:
The Court of Appeals misconceived the nature of this litigation in
holding that the Clearfield Trust case controlled.... The present
litigation is purely between private parties and does not touch the
rights and duties of the United States. The only possible interest of
the United States in a situation like the one here, exclusively involving
the transfer of Government paper between private persons, is that the
floating of securities of the United States might somehow or other be
adversely affected by the local rule of a particular State regarding the
liability of a converter. This is far too remote a possibility to justify
78 E.g., Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947); United States v.
County of Alleghany, 322 U.S. 174 (1944) ; United States v. Standard Rice Co., 323
U.S. 106 (1944).
7 E.g., United States v. Brosnan, 363 U.S. 237 (1960); DeSylva v. Ballentine,
Guardian 351 U.S. 570 (1956) ; Board of County Commr's v. United States, supra
note 77. (Neither this nor the preceding note is intended to be exhaustive as all these
cases were policy decisions of the purest kind. Thus an "adding-machine" approach
,to citations would seem futile.)
80 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
81 Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Rocco, 226 F.2d 297 (3rd Cir.
1955).
82 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
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the application of federal law to transactions essentially of local
concern.8 3
It is clear that Parnell was a compromise solution which followed
Clearfield only to the extent necessary to protect the interests of the
United States"8' thus resulting in minimal interference with state-
created rights. The other case cited in footnote 14 of Free, Holmberg
v. Armbrecht,5 adds little to Clearfield. But it does emphasize that
even if private parties are litigating federally-created rights, a uniform
federal rule will be applied, when necessary to protect the substance
of the rights. In Holmberg, creditors of a defunct bank sued a share-
holder to enforce liability under the Federal Farm Loan Act.16 The
defendant had successfully concealed his identity for a time such that
one defense was a state statute of limitations, which if applicable
would have barred the action. The Supreme Court rejected this,
holding that a uniform federal doctrine of equity governed, tolling
the statute until the fraudulent concealment was (or should have been)
discovered. This federal doctrine was applied even though there was
no direct interest of the federal government at stake.
From the discussion of these cases, it is clear that the Court in Free
was faced with the problem of what law should be applied to define the
"fraud exception." The Court chose Clearfield and its uniform federal
rule. Before considering the wisdom of this choice, its consequences
must be investigated.
What Is Federal Fraud? One seeking a "black-letter" statement
of this concept will no doubt be disappointed, for as Mr. Justice
Douglas wrote in Clearfield:8" "In the absence of an applicable Act
of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule
of law according to their own standards." In reality the Court, creates
the required federal law with an eye to the "common-law sources," e.g.,
decisions of state, federal and English courts. This process has.been
succinctly described by Mr. Justice Jackson"
Although... the case... is to be deemed one arising under the laws
of the United States, no federal statute purports to define the.....
rights.... [The]'...question is ... whether...we are bound to
83 Id. at 33.84 Thus the fallacy of using Parmell to sustain the "convenience theory" in Free, as
was done by the Texas court, should be obvious. See 369 U.S. at 666; and quotes
accompanying notes 19 and 22 supra.
85 327 U.S. 392 (1946).
80 12 U.S.C. § 812 (1959).
87 318 U.S. at 367.
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apply the law of some particular state or ... to put it bluntly, we may
make our own law from materials found in common-law sources. 88
Thus, the law applied in Clearfield89 was derived from the pre-Erie
federal law merchant, and more particularly from United States v.
National Exchange Bank," while the federal equitable doctrine used in
Holmberg was an "old chancery rule" as enunciated in Bailey v.
Glover,"' another pre-Erie case.
However, these cases shed no light on the substance of the doctrine
applicable in Free. Nor do the cases cited in the Amicus Curiae Brief
of the Government." The latter describe "circumstances which might
be denominated fraudulent under general legal principles."9 These
speak of fraud being concealment when there is a duty to disclose due
to a confidential or fiduciary relation,"' or an attempt by a trustee to
achieve a profit through use of entrusted funds. 5 Nor has this author
discovered any federal cases which are really useful, e.g., speaking to
the interplay between the duties of the husband as manager of the
community property and a federally-created interest, or ones which
tell the reader more than that a "just" rule will be formulated. Clear-
field demands uniformity. Thus, if we attempt to apply such general
principles to Free or Yiatchos, the basic question seems: How far will
state-created rights, duties, burden of proof, and such be respected?
This much is certain from Free: The bonds show prima facie the
federal ownership rights so that the burden of proof will be upon the
party challenging these rights, and that this is not carried by merely
contrary allegations or bringing suit, as in Allen and Yiatchos.8 This
follows for a number of reasons. First, any other reading of Free
would result in an emasculation of the ownership rights and a re-
instatement of the "convenience theory." This, in effect, is what the
88 Concurring in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 468 (1942).
89 Namely, that mere delay in notice of the forgery and demand for reimbursement
would not absolve the Trust Company, without a showing of actual damage thereby.
90 214 U.S. 302 (1909).
9121 Wall. 342 (1875).
92 At p. 27, n. 8.
93 At p. 27.
94 Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); Murphy v. Cartwright, 202 F.2d 71
(5th Cir. 1953); and Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
95 Magruder v. Drury, 235 U.S. 106 (1914).
96 Neither case attaches any significance to the bonds themselves. The cases ap-
parently are an example of the familiar principle that property once community in
character will be presumed to be such absent a contrary showing (see e.g., Marston
v. Rue, 92 Wash. 129, 159 Pac. 111 (1916).) Gannon appears to have been cited in
Yiatchos to show, in addition to the "fiduciary" nature of the managerial duties, that
this presumption might be rebutted by a showing that the husband acted with intent
to benefit the community.
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Washington court has done in Yiatchos and Allen. As will be re-
called, there was no proof of the circumstances surrounding the bond
purchases in either case. Secondly, an approach similar to the Wash-
ington court's was argued unsuccessfully by respondent Bland.97
Finally, on remand of Free, the Texas court reversed its prior judg-
ment and reinstated that of the Court of Civil Appeals, holding there
to be no question of fraud presented in the pleadings or record.98
While making no attempt to spell out the content of federal fraud, the
Texas court appears to have interpreted the Supreme Court's mandate
as this author suggests.9"
Although we may be able to say with some certainty what federal
fraud is not, its actual content remains a mystery. Will the Court
require a showing of no agreement by the wife to buy the bonds, or
merely that she had no knowledge thereof and/or of no later acquies-
cence, or that there was no benefit to the community? Will a showing
by the husband of intent to benefit the community or actual benefit
overcome a showing of no agreement or acquiescence by the wife? Will
the varying managerial duties of husbands under state laws be adopted
-or will a uniform federal duty be imposed? The author submits that
we just cannot answer these (and other similar) questions. In short,
"federal fraud" must remain a vague concept until the Court pours
meaning into it by creating the applicable law in a specific case.
Wisdom of Federal Fraud. It appears that the choice of Clearfield-
a uniform federal rule to define the "fraud exception"-is a poor one.
There being no discussion in Free of this choice, we must assume the
Court felt the policies governing interpretation of the survivorship
provisions (as establishing federal ownership rather than "conven-
ience") strong enough to further override state law in defining the
exception."' As this was a policy decision, the Court should have
97 Brief for Respondent, p. 15: "Petitioner ... (Free) also overlooks that he
failed to raise properly an issue of fact that the wife had no knowledge or gave
consent . . . (to the purchase of the bonds) . . . and there is no pleading or proof
of such knowledge or consent, although as plaintiff he had the burden of pleading
and proof."9 8 Bland v. Free, 359 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1962).
90 Ibid. Thus, Bland having failed to plead fraud or breach of trust, or to introduce
affidavits to that effect, Free was awarded the bonds, clear of reimbursement, on his
motion for summary judgment.
100 Indeed, this would seem a mandatory assumption, unless one believes that the
Court has merely cited these cases at random, which seems highly unlikely in view
of the divergent policies effectuated in the others discussed and cited mtpra, which
were not cited in footnote 14, and since the parties did address arguments to this
point. (See: Brief for Petitioner, p. 32; Brief for Respondent, pp. 13-15; Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae, pp. 20, 27.)
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articulated the reasons therefor.1"' Further, the choice of a uniform
rule here seems unwise. A solution analogous to Parnell would be
more desirable and compatible with our federal system."°2 It is diffi-
cult to see what federal concern there could be in the law applicable
to the "fraud exception." Since the Government will pay only the
registered owner or beneficiary,"' and since the substance of these
ownership rights is protected from the "convenience theory" by Free,
the exception could arise only in litigation between private parties and
could concern only private interests. Thus, the compromise approach
of Parnell seems equally wise here, if not more so, for the reason that
the bond regulations presuppose an established system of state-created
rights when they speak of registration "which must express the actual
ownership,' 0  which rights should, in keeping with our concept of a
national government of limited delegated powers, be respected until
and unless a substantial federal interest demands the contrary. In
short, the author submits, there is no such interest present in the
"fraud exception." The better solution is to incorporate state law to
define the exception, with a caveat that the state construction of "fraud
or breach of trust tantamount thereto," while allowing for local varia-
101 Failure to do so of course leads to speculation rather than critical analysis, and
renders prediction of what the Court will do with similar policy questions in the
future unduly hazardous. As Professor Llewellyn has exhorted the courts: "Sing us
a reason !" Llewellyn, Status of the Rule of Judicial Precedent, 14 U. CINc. L.
Rav. 207 (1940).
102 Had the Court cited Parnell in footnote 14 to define the exception, while the
burden of proof would still be upon the challenger to overcome the prima facie status
of the bonds, other rights and duties would be resolved by the relatively settled state
law. Actually, there was a dissent in Parnell by Justices Black and Douglas who
argued that the uniform rule of Clearfield should have been applied to the whole of
Parnell. At 352 U.S. 35 we find: "But the policy surrounding our choice of laws is
concerned with the convenience, certainty, and definiteness in having one set of
rules. . . ." This reasoning, which the author submits to be fallacious, seems to
underlie footnote 14 in Free. The advantages of this approach purport to be conven-
ience and certainty. Perhaps the former is valid so far as the Government is con-
cerned, but the latter is not--even as to the interest of the Government. The only
thing certain about the federal rule would be its uniformity. No doubt the Court
would formulate the rule by referring to the "common-law sources," but the fact that
litigation has ensued and reached the Supreme Court implies a conflict amongst these
sources. Thus, the content of such a rule must remain unknown until pronounced by
the Court. Even after the general rule has been created, the Court must further act
interstitially to fill the gaps case by case. Of course, on the other side of the coin,
the solution of the majority in Parnell is no more certain. Indeed, such certainty is
an illusion. For, even assuming there to be a certain set of state principles governing
the situation (and omitting conflict of laws problems), the critical question is whether
the disputed issue is one of essentially local interest or one in which there is a sub-
stantial federal interest demanding uniformity. This is of course the same policy
decision which the minority would have to make in formulating its rule. Thus, the
problem really boils down to uniformity vis-a-vis respect for state law and the
greater ease with which the local practitioner can handle familiar materials.
103 See 31 CFR § 315.15, set out in note 2 supra.
104 See 31 CFR § 315.5, set out in note 2 supra.
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tions, must be consonant with normal usage."'
Yiatchos Assessed. From the foregoing it is clear that Decker v.
Fowler should no longer be valid.' Thus, distributing half the bonds
pursuant to Angel's will is clearly erroneous, whether or not Pearle can
prevail under the "fraud exception" to Free.' Allen and Yiatchos (as
to the wife's interest) may well fit within the "fraud exception" to
Free, but as will be recalled the Washington court labelled the conduct
of the husbands fraudulent, using purely state law. Thus, neither Allen
nor Yiatchos can be considered valid as written. Whether in fact either
or both cases fit within the exception to Free we cannot say due to
the vague standards prescribed by the Supreme Court, and the lack
of findings on the allegedly fraudulent conduct by the Washington
trial courts. Therefore, the proper disposition of Yiatckos would have
been to remand in order to give Pearle a chance to show "fraud," if
such existed.
If the preceding analysis of Free and Yiatclos is correct, the reader
may be puzzled by the result in Yiatckos. Certainly the failure to
follow Free was not accidental, nor can the short time interval between
the decisions explain the position of the Washington court. The author
submits that the real reasons for Yiatckos are policy ones, unfortu-
nately unarticulated. Thus, its precedential value cannot accurately be
assessed. Further, it is submitted that Yiatckos is the result of two
main policies: a) The desire of the court to mold a predictable rule for
the local practitioner by utilizing familiar state materials; and b) the
jealous preservation of states' rights against encroachment by the
federal government."" The wisdom of the first policy is apparent when
'o5 This would be analogous to the solution in DeSylva v. Ballentine, note 79 supra,
wherein state definitions of "children" were incorporated into the Federal Copyright
Act (17 U.S.C. § 1 (1959)) with such a caveat.
106 Especially so since note 9 of Free, 369 U.S. at 668, cites Decker (and the
"convenience theory") as an improper construction of the regulations.
107 This assertion follows from reading Free to allow the husband unilaterally to
convert community to separate property without any formalities required by state
law. While the wife may be able to preserve her interest (as separate property) by
showing "fraud," this would not prevent the husband from changing his community
interest to a separate status. Thus any "fraud" on the wife's rights will nullify the
transaction only to the extent of her community interest. Clearly, the husband's sub-
sequent will can have no effect since his interest is then governed by the survivorship
regulations.
108 Perhaps other considerations such as 1) protection of the wife; 2) protection
of the testator's beneficiaries; and 3) preservation of the community property system
also had some weight. However, the first is also covered by the "fraud exception"
of Free, while the second seems neutral in Yiatchos (as Gust was also a beneficiary
under the will) unless related to the preservation of state law against -federal en-
croachment. This preservation of state law---either community property or wills-
would seem to have no particular significance apart from the larger question of states'
rights, which this author considers one of the main policies.
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the foregoing difficulty in defining federal fraud is considered. Had a
new trial been ordered in Yiatchos, just how could counsel or the trial
judge hope to formulate with any degree of confidence the proper
concept of federal fraud? The answer to this would seem to lie in a
more reserved use of the Clearfield Doctrine by the Supreme Court.
Especially so where, as with the "fraud exception," no federal interest
requires uniformity.
The second policy (manifested by the extreme reluctance of the
Washington court to follow the "law" as pronounced by the Supreme
Court, without a direct mandate from that Court109) seems a most
regrettable one for a number of reasons. First, of course, it has left
confusion in the law of Washington re savings bonds and community
property, rendering advice to clients in this area most difficult. Ironic-
ally, this negates the first policy, as the law in this area is now anything
but predictable in Washington. But of perhaps greater import, and
completely apart from whether either of these policies are justified,
they must have a subversive effect on the "rule of law." Few would
argue that avoidance of the law deemed "supreme" by our Constitu-
tion is a good thing. Therefore, it would seem that a more harmonious
federalism should result if the Washington court would more faithfully
follow the "law" as pronounced by the Supreme Court-and if the
latter Court would be less quick to displace the law of the states with
federal law."'
RICHARD E. KEEFE
109 That this reluctance is not an isolated thing, and in fact is regrettably all too
common in Washington, is demonstrated by the volume of litigation over the Cowlitz
dams and Seattle's "Pend Orielle project." By overly literal or erroneous reading
of Supreme Court decisions and the Supremacy Clause, the Washington court has
needlessly prolonged these disputes. Of course, neither the FPC nor the Supreme
Court has acted with much consideration or respect for the wishes of the people of
Washington in permitting its municipal corporations to violate the laws of Washington
by means of FPC licenses. Thus, we have another example of the failure by both
state and federal courts (and agencies) to promote a harmonious federalism. In
fact, it would seem that an openly antagonistic spirit prevails (see particularly the
dissenting opinion of Judges Ott and Rosellini in the latest round of the Cowlitz battle,
City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 160 Wash. Dec. 64, 371 P.2d 938, 947 (1962) ). See
as to the Cowlitz fiasco (cited in chronological order) : Washington Dept. of Game
v. FPC, 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 936 (1954); City of
Tacoma v. Taxpayers, 43 Wn.2d 468, 262 P.2d 214 (1953) ; (rest of citations under
same title) 49 Wn.2d 781, 307 P.2d 567 (1957) ; 357 U.S. 320 (1958); 160 Wash.
Dec. 64, 371 P.2d 938 (1962). The "Pend Orielle project" has thus far appeared in
the reports (again in chronological order) as: Beezer v. City of Seattle, 160 Wash.
Dec. 241, 373 P.2d 796 (1962) ; P.U.D. No. 1 v. FPC, 308 F.2d 318 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
cert. denied, 83 Sup. Ct. 719 (1963) ; Beezer v. City of Seattle, 160 Wash. Dec. 652,
375 P.2d 256 (1962).
110 The reader might compare a recent Note written on Free, in 37 TUL. L. Rv.
at 115 (1962). That article, while critical of Free and arguing for the "convenience
theory" (see especially, p. 116 and note 14), does point out (at 117) that the Wash-
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